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Weekly Analysis

External Endorsements Shape Legitimacy in the Western Balkans

WBC Staff - 14 Apr 2026
US businessman Donald Trump Jr (2nd-L) arrives to meet a group of Bosnian Serb political leaders, as well as a select group of businessmen close to the ruling party in the political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina in Banja Luka on April 7, 2026. (Photo by AFP via Getty Images)

WBC Staff

This week in the Western Balkans, the United States and Hungary played active roles in shaping political dynamics surrounding energy infrastructure and sovereignty disputes.

Donald Trump Jr. criticized the EU while on a business visit to Banja Luka.

Serbia is seeking another waiver from the U.S. for its oil company amid potential withdrawal of EU funding partially related to Belgrade’s sustained relationship with Russia. The U.S. further emphasized energy diversification by signing a memorandum of understanding with North Macedonia’s minister of Energy, Mines, and Mineral Resources. 

Divergent perspectives among Serbia and Kosovo on the importance of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) following a Security Council review underscore strained ethnic tensions and the role of international actors in sovereignty legitimacy cases.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

While on a visit to Republika Srpska for a business panel, Donald Trump Jr., son of the U.S. president, criticized the EU, stating its policies discouraged investment. He also predicted a “major fracture” between the EU’s eastern and western states.

The U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo noted that Trump Jr.’s visit was made in a “private capacity.” It occurred during U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s visit to Hungary in an attempt to bolster Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s party ahead of parliamentary elections. Leaders from both Hungary and Bosnia’s Serb entity have been seeking to gain U.S. favor amid a more divided West.

Considering RS’s history of secessionist discourse that capitalizes on generating skepticism toward international oversight, Trump Jr.’s comments may provide a symbolic backing for its continued sovereignty claims. This is visible with current RS President Siniša Karan’s statements that Dayton autonomy is a right of RS, an attempt to reframe secessionist claims under the embedded framework of Bosnia’s governance structure. This may be an attempt to make RS defiance more palatable as Banja Luka postures toward Washington.

Former RS President Milorad Dodik praised the visit, using it to portray Republika Srpska as operating autonomously through cultivating strong international partnerships. Thus, Trump Jr.’s visit, while not in official political capacity, was most likely received by RS officials as symbolic backing for continuation of RS politics that challenge Bosnia and Herzegovina’s broader governance cohesion. 

Serbia 

The EU is considering withholding 1.5 billion euros from Serbia over concerns about its continued ties with Russia, democratic backsliding, and judiciary changes.

The most tangible form of connection with Moscow is in the energy sector. This week, Serbia’s oil and gas company, NIS, sought another sanctions waiver from the United States to continue importing oil from Russia while it awaits sale to Hungary’s MOL. By taking over Russia’s ownership in Serbia’s gas industry, Hungary has positioned itself as a mediator between European states from the former Soviet space that seek to join the EU but must sever dependency from Moscow in the process. 

That said, Orbán’s loss gives the EU opportunity to dismantle this mediation and strengthen itself against Russian influence that has long posed a direct challenge from within the Union through Budapest. Concurrently, the EU’s proposed funding action may offer incentive for Belgrade to reconsider the depth of its Russian partnerships, although it is unlikely the action will completely sever the relationship. 

In terms of other international partnerships, Serbia is set to produce drones with Israel’s Elbit Systems, the country’s top drone producer, which has been criticized for its contribution to Israeli involvement in Gaza. The drone factory in Serbia will be co-owned, with the Israeli company holding 51% ownership. This greatly enhances Serbian-Israeli defense cooperation, which already consists of weapons exports and cargo flights.

Considering Serbia derives defense support from China and Russia while also balancing NATO partnership and prospective EU membership, an increased partnership with the Israeli firm could be an extension of Belgrade’s geopolitical balancing act, as well as a way to curry favor with the U.S. during its joint military action with Israel in Iran. 

Kosovo 

During a U.N. Security Council briefing on UNMIK, Kosovar First Deputy Prime Minister Glauk Konjufca advocated that Kosovo has demonstrated itself as an “independent, sovereign, and democratic state,” which is sufficient for the departure of the peacekeeping mission. As such, Pristina maintained that attention be shifted from a U.N. security presence in Kosovo to Kosovo’s integration into the U.N.

Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Đurić, on the other hand, acknowledged UNMIK as “indispensable” for protecting Serbs, cited concerns of systematic pressures on the Serb community in Kosovo, and advocated for strengthening of the security mission. As Pristina increases pressure to close parallel Serb institutions in the northern provinces, this continued international oversight essentially allows Belgrade sustained reach into Kosovo’s politics. 

In Kosovo, the importance of the UNMIK mission to Serbs was reinforced. Danijela Nikolic, chair of the Serbian Parliament’s Committee for Kosovo and Metohija, advocated that Pristina begin the process of establishing the Community of Serb Municipalities (JSC). This process is viewed as an obligation for continued mediation dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. Kosovar politicians like current Prime Minister Albin Kurti have long cited concerns that establishing such communities would replicate a Republika Srpska-type entity within Kosovo that would further exacerbate tensions and undermine political functionality. 

In fact, former Kosovar President Vjosa Osmani made a claim that her greatest achievement in office was obtaining a letter from U.S. President Donald Trump containing a statement of support for the territorial integrity of Kosovo, in which no dialogue with Serbia or for JSC are necessary. This runs counter to the U.S. suspension of dialogue in September 2025 over concerns that the Kurti caretaker government had increased tensions with the northern Serb-majority municipalities.

The Assembly of Kosovo adopted the “Resolution on the protection of the historical truth about the war in Kosovo 1998-1999,” a measure meant to protect the official narrative of the war, including documenting war crimes committed by Serbian forces and upholding legal penalties for denying or minimizing events. Such legal codification is critical for countries experiencing high levels of ethnic tensions and is a part of Bosnia’s legal codes. Considering the timing of the resolution with UNMIK review and increased international pressure for dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, Serbia may perceive its passage as legislative escalation. 

North Macedonia 

As the war in the Middle East continues to strain energy markets, North Macedonia is faced with added economic uncertainty and pressure. In response, Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski announced that he expects the country’s Energy Regulatory Commission to reduce the price of petroleum products by dropping the value-added tax on fuel from 18% to 10%. Minister of Energy, Mines, and Mineral Resources Sanja Bozhinovska and U.S. Deputy Secretary Christopher Landau signed a memorandum of understanding designated to diversify North Macedonia’s supply of oil and liquified natural gas, highlighting the importance of diversified energy sources and partnerships.

In a region like the Balkans, where ethnic tensions run high and rhetorical posturing is common, economic strain can quickly translate to political or civic strife. Therefore, reducing this burden through energy diversification is critical to contain potential outbreaks of conflict.

Regional Implications

Following Orbán’s defeat, the challenge for the EU will be the timely strengthening of incentive measures for Western Balkan accession. As enlargement increases in importance for broader European security, opportunity exists to diminish Russian influence via Hungary that’s encouraged Serbia and RS to stage similar acts of ambiguous alignment.

The need for resolute action is further important amid the potential transfer of Serbia’s oil company to MOL, which would tangibly connect Serbia to Hungary. Given the current global energy crisis, as economic strain mounts on countries in the region like North Macedonia, Washington and the EU have the opportunity to promote diversification of energy infrastructure that can simultaneously mitigate any future deepening of malign partnerships. 

Disagreement between Belgrade and Pristina on the role of a sustained UNMIK presence highlights continued strain in one of the region’s most contentious sovereignty conflicts.