Rising Fuel Prices Further Political Strain

This week in the Western Balkans, economic pressures prompted deepening political fragmentation and security recalculation across the region.

Opposition parties in Albania are using rising fuel prices as a political tool to mobilize opposition to Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government, while Serbia extended a ban on oil exports to safeguard the domestic market.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, truckers blocked key border points with Croatia to protest the EU’s tightening of Schengen visa limits. Entity-level friction was visible with Savo Minić’s third appointment as prime minister in Republika Srpska (RS) in six months. The move has drawn controversy from the entity of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH).

In Kosovo, the potential of another caretaker government under Prime Minister Albin Kurti raises the risk of increased tension with the ethnic Serb population that could further hinder dialogue with Serbia. Appeals from the Serb List and Kurti’s use of Serbian military exercises at the countries’ shared border as an attempt to consolidate approval demonstrate this dynamic.

Albania

The conflict in the Middle East is catalyzing a further divide between the opposition and the ruling Socialist Party in Albania’s parliament.

Parliament members from the Socialist Party adopted a resolution to designate Iran as a “state sponsor of terrorism.” Opposition members boycotted the vote, calling it illegal as Parliament was out of session, and claiming the resolution was made to further Rama’s political agenda. The vote signaled support for the U.S. and Western allies, while also symbolically serving to condemn recent cyberattacks by Iran-linked hackers targeting Parliament, the third such attack since 2022. The continued boycott of political decisions and rhetoric by opposition leaders has the potential to create legislative stasis.

Fuel price increases precipitated by the Iran conflict serve as a tangible point of discontent behind deepening political clashes. Albania has the region’s highest oil prices, and the Rama government has set the oil tax rate at 60% while the EU average is 50%. Following a backlash, the Rama government reinstated the Transparency Board, a fuel price monitor, while also implementing a reduction in the oil excise tax by 20% if the price exceeds 220 lek (2 euros) per liter. Such efforts represent strategic concessions by the Rama government to maintain approval amid economic uncertainty and sustained antigovernment protests. The Transparency Board revival shows the effort to check corruption while protecting customers and preventing market abuse based on speculatory pricing.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Following Savo Minić’s resignation from the RS prime minister post amid concerns over RS government status, Minić has been swiftly reappointed to the post by RS President-elect, Siniša Karan. This marks Minić’s third appointment to the post in six months – a move that has come under fire by officials in the FBiH.

According to the RS Constitution, the entity’s president is the only one who can appoint a prime minister. Minić was initially appointed by Milorad Dodik when Dodik had already been barred from the office amid a court conviction, and Bosnia's Constitutional Court ruled the government appointed under Dodik unconstitutional. The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Democratic Front (DF) from the Federation’s House of Representatives requested that the Constitutional Court annul the RS selection process, claiming it directly violates the constitutional rule of law. Such disputes present continued friction between Bosnia’s two entities and the continued attempts by the RS to establish parallel governance and legal systems.

Institutional frictions similarly ensued in relation with the EU. Truckers blocked border crossings between EU states and Croatia, citing rules that limit their stay in the Schengen area despite holding the necessary permits and licenses. Blockades were lifted one day later after Bosnian authorities promised to find a solution. A similar dynamic unfolded in January, when blockades in Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia were lifted following the announcement of talks in Brussels. That said, no key decisions have been reached, precipitating renewed protests.

Without clear and decisive leadership from Brussels, the visa rules risk heightened disillusionment among prospective EU member states based on economic isolation. RS leadership can manipulate sustained disillusionment to further anti-elitist narratives aimed at EU oversight. This would sustain the impasse between Bosnia’s two entities, thus stalling accession and widening room for escalation. 

Serbia

Serbia extended its ban on crude oil exports until April 2 amid the conflict in the Middle East that is straining resource reserves to safeguard the domestic market. Serbia released diesel fuel from its reserves to help cushion against price surges. This strategy was boosted by U.S. approval for an extended sanctions waiver on Serbia’s majority Russian-owned oil company NIS until April 17, allowing Belgrade to import more oil.

NIS has secured at least eight such waivers since it first came under sanction pressure from the U.S. in January 2025. Enforcement took effect in October 2025, but waivers continue to be issued as the company awaits sale to Hungary’s MOL. As the EU and U.S. continue to sanction Russia, Hungary and Serbia have deepened energy cooperation. Notably, both Budapest and Belgrade maintain ties with Moscow. Therefore, the sale to MOL may not completely sever Serbia’s dependency on Russia, but rather strengthen the trilateral relationship, which could prompt greater tension within the EU.

Continued sanctions waivers by Washington suggest token punitive measures rather than accountability. Essentially, the waivers permit Serbia to continue maneuvering between the West and maligned relationships to achieve maximum economic concessions. The secondary effect of this translates into EU accession and rule of law measures as Serbia increasingly tests the bounds of enforceability. 

Kosovo

There are concerns regarding a potential Kurti caretaker government if the Constitutional Court decides snap elections can proceed. This would allow Kurti to press the limits of executive power with little accountability, particularly in relation to evading discussions with Belgrade and northern Serb municipalities.

Ethnic tensions are diffusing already. The Serb List, the largest party representing ethnic Serbs, filed an appeal to the Constitutional Court, complaining that the appointment of Serb deputy ministers in Kurti’s government as being carried out without the approval of Serb MPs. This heightens already existing perceptions of unilateral executive decision-making without accountability.

Internationally, Kurti is also projecting Serb-related tensions to consolidate popular support in a tense political environment after the Serbian army conducted routine military exercises near the border with Kosovo. While NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) acknowledged it had been informed of the exercises, Kurti attempted to weaponize the event. Speaking at a government meeting, Kurti recalled that the same 63rd Paratrooper Brigade trained “the group of criminal Milan Radoičić, who carried out the aggressive and terrorist attack in Banjska,” an event that significantly heightened tensions between the two countries in 2023. Use of such rhetoric suggests Kurti recognizes Kosovo’s impending governance crisis and is seeking to build support by focusing on politically sensitive issues, as he may soon either face parliamentary elections or lead a caretaker government.

Keep in mind the fact that Serbia will conduct joint exercises with NATO in May, at Belgrade’s invitation. Although Serbia emphasizes its neutral stance toward NATO, it participates in joint drills to improve regional interoperability under the Partnership Through Peace framework. Continued commitment to this program signifies acknowledgement of geopolitical reality. Being surrounded by NATO allies hinders Serbia’s offensive capabilities, despite recent amplified defense posturing.

Regional Implications 

U.S. President Donald Trump recently criticized NATO allies, and the U.S. has stated its desire to draw down NATO involvement. Doing so would impact KFOR capacity, and potential fractures within the alliance may offer Serbia space to capitalize on changing security landscapes.

Belgrade’s simultaneous military cooperation with NATO, China, and Russia illustrates its devotion to a multi-vector policy that allows Belgrade to maintain plausible deniability while amplifying perceived escalation. Combined with regional economic and energy vulnerabilities, the political impasse in Kosovo, the erosion of political cooperation in Albania, and the sustained friction between Bosnia’s entities, amplifying the need for a dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. 

The test will be whether Belgrade and Pristina can overcome political actors like Kurti and Vučić, who operate under escalatory ambiguity and reduced accountability as a means of securing popular support.