Banjska Attack Verdict Raises Questions on Future of Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue

Bosnia and Herzegovina 

On April 28, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia signed an intergovernmental agreement regarding transport of U.S. natural gas to Bosnia from a liquefied natural gas terminal on the Croatian island of Krk. 

The agreement came despite EU warnings, particularly regarding Bosnia choosing a private U.S. company to be a key partner in the Southern Interconnection pipeline initiative.  

Per EU regulations, any energy-sector legislation must be coordinated with Brussels and consistent with Bosnia’s EU accession obligations. To speed up the pipeline agreement, Bosnia adopted legislation allowing the country to bypass competitive tender procedures and designate a single company as a sole investor and developer. This effectively removed the opportunity for any European companies to compete for the tender. Now, the agreement may jeopardize Bosnia’s access to the European energy market and $1.16 billion in funding under the EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans.  

AAFS Infrastructure and Energy, which won the bid, was founded in November 2025 and has no prior infrastructure development record. Attorney Jesse Binnall, who defended U.S. President Donald Trump in civil cases stemming from the 2021 Capitol riot, and Joe Flynn, brother of former U.S. national security adviser Michael Flynn, are among AAFS’s directors. Binnall argues that the pipeline is a “priority for the Trump administration”, while Flynn sees the pipeline as a “strategic national investment of the United States.” 

The Southern Interconnection Pipeline dispute may become the most consequential flashpoint in the Western Balkans this year as it represents a collision of EU and U.S. geopolitical and commercial interests, institutional processes, and rule-of-law compliance.  

Brussels has long supported the project as a vehicle for reducing European dependence on Russian gas and integrating Bosnia into the EU energy market. Yet, the pipeline project, as it stands right now, defies nearly all principles the EU attached to that vision.  

Bosnia ignored its obligations as an EU candidate state by bypassing the competitive tender requirements and handing the contract to a company with direct links to a U.S. administration that has repeatedly treated the EU as an adversary rather than an ally. For the EU, the pipeline project embodies the opaque procurement process that EU accession is supposed to eliminate and illustrates that Brussels may have lost control of the process.  

Bosnia likely picked the AAFS with a conviction that a Trump-connected company may accelerate the pipeline financing and development, but the country now finds itself caught between clashing U.S. and EU interests. While originally intended to eliminate Bosnia’s dependence on Russia, the EU’s key geopolitical rival, the country is now impacted by a different set of geopolitical interests that shape the credibility of its EU membership path.  

As the pipeline project moves forward, Brussels will have to calculate how to resolve the dispute without alienating supporters of Bosnia’s EU path within Bosnia, while Bosnian officials must decide how to restore the country’s credibility as a prospective EU member without jeopardizing the project or its relations with the United States. 

Separate from the Southern Interconnection, Sarajevo Gas signed a $619.4 million contract with Serbian-led Konvar to construct the Sepak-Novi Grad pipeline, which would cross Republika Srpska, running from the eastern border with Serbia to the western border with Croatia. This project, known as the Eastern Interconnection, would bolster Republika Srpska’s energy infrastructure, while Southern Interconnection is primarily an energy initiative from the Federation.  

Deputy Chairperson of the Council of Ministers Staša Košarac, who is a member of Republika Srpska’s SNSD party, reignited the issue of Trgovska Gora, a proposed nuclear waste disposal site at the Bosnia-Croatia border, noting that documentation is being prepared ahead of a confrontation with Croatia, which is planning the project. Košarac noted that the Federation had been collaborating with RS on the issue. The timing of Košarac’s announcement – just days before the signing of Bosnia-Croatia pipeline deal – is peculiar, as it may signal RS inclination to either convolute the U.S.-backed pipeline agreement being sought after by the Federation, or extract political concessions.

The parallel development of two pipeline projects, the Federation-led, U.S.-linked Southern Interconnection, and RS-led, Serbia-linked Eastern Interconnection, mirrors the broader political and institutional fragmentation within Bosnia. Instead of pursuing a unified energy strategy, Bosnia is developing two distinct infrastructure projects that follow its ethnopolitical divisions. The Southern Interconnection will offer the Federation a Euro-Atlantic alternative to decades of reliance on Russian gas, while the Eastern Interconnection will deepen RS’s dependence on Serbia. As both pipeline projects move forward, they will likely further entrench the diverging geopolitical orientations of Bosnia’s two entities and complicate attempts toward unified EU accession efforts in the country. 

Montenegro 

In a landmark development for Western Balkans EU enlargement, the EU decided to move forward with drafting Montenegro’s accession treaty by establishing a working group on April 22. European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos confirmed that Montenegro's “place inside the EU is now taking shape,” while Montenegrin Minister for European Affairs Maida Gorčević called the development the “final lap of a 14-year marathon” toward EU membership. 

Montenegro has been in EU accession negotiations since 2012 and has provisionally closed 14 of 33 negotiating chapters., making it the most advanced EU candidate among the Western Balkans countries. The country’s government hopes to join the bloc by 2028, which would mark the EU’s first enlargement in 15 years. 

Crucially, Kos indicated that Montenegro’s accession treaty would be “the first of a new generation” and likely incorporate enhanced safeguard clauses to prevent democratic backsliding after accession. This indicates that Brussels is clearly attempting to draw lessons from its experiences with Hungary and Poland. 

For other Western Balkans states, Montenegro’s milestone is the most concrete indicator that the EU’s enlargement process is genuinely accelerating after a widely criticized stagnation since 2013. Yet it also serves as a pressure point, particularly for Serbia and Bosnia. Despite opening 22 negotiating chapters, Serbia’s EU path has stalled amid rule-of-law issues, while Bosnia’s pipeline dispute and political dysfunction continue to delay formal accession progress. 

Albania 

Albanian Foreign Minister Ferit Hoxha came under fire after referring to Albanians in North Macedonia as “idiots” in a WhatsApp message that went public, drawing condemnation from. VLEN, the coalition of Albanians in North Macedonia’s parliament. 

Within Albania, the leader of Albania’s opposition party’s parliamentary group, Gazment Bardhi, condemned the message and called for Hoxha’s immediate resignation, claiming that his words undermine national dignity and violate constitutional norms. 

While the Hoxha affair may be a significant embarrassment for the Albanian government, its consequences will depend on how Tirana manages the aftermath. 

Albania explicitly frames its foreign policy around advocacy and support for Albanian communities across the Western Balkans. A foreign minister demeaning one of those communities undermines a central pillar of Albania’s soft power and foreign policy. 

Crucially, this development may provide a useful instrument to domestic opposition in Albania. Edi Rama’s government has, so far, proved resilient even in the face of major corruption scandals and persistent public demonstrations. Whether Hoxha is removed from his position or forced to step down will show how much political capital Rama’s government is willing to spend to defend him. 

Regional Implications 

The sharpening great power competition is the most consequential overarching dynamic this week as the Southern Interconnection dispute pits the EU directly against the Trump administration. Bosnia’s dilemma is an expression of a broader challenge facing all Western Balkan governments: How to navigate competing U.S. and EU demands when the two patrons are not aligned.

The Banjska attack verdict illustrates another theme: The Serbia-Kosovo normalization dialogue is not stalling but moving backward. Serbia’s refusal to charge Radoičić and his collaborators and branding the verdict against three assailants as politically motivated shows that Serbia and Kosovo hold fundamentally incompatible narratives of a documented violent event. This development means that any diplomatic effort regarding the verdict and its place within the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue that assumes shared facts, is already severely undermined.

Finally, Montenegro’s EU accession milestone offers an optimistic counterpoint. If Montenegro can sustain its reform trajectory and close the remaining chapters in 2026, it will demonstrate that EU membership is indeed achievable for Western Balkan states. This would present an important signal to Albania and North Macedonia, and eventually for Bosnia and Serbia.