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Weekly Analysis

Border Disruptions and Rising Securitization

WBC Staff - 2 Feb 2026
Western Balkans Analysis: Jan. 27- Feb. 2, 2026
GEVGELIJA, NORTH MACEDONIA - JANUARY 26: North Macedonian professional transport companies are blocking the North Macedonian-Greek border in protest against the European Union regulation that limits drivers to 90 working days within the Schengen Area, in Gevgelija, North Macedonia, on January 26, 2026. The protest is also supported by transport companies from Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, who are facing the same challenges in international freight transport. (Photo by Nake Batev/Anadolu via Getty Images).

WBC Staff

Between Jan. 27 and Feb. 2, the Western Balkans’ political dynamics were marked by trade and mobility disruptions, EU enlargement assurances via financial aid, and securitization of regional politics. 

Across the region, lorry drivers blocked key border crossings in protest of the EU’s tighter enforcement of Schengen limits for non-EU nationals’ stays. The blockades disrupted supply chains and created long queues, which imposed high costs on logistics firms and exporters amid missed deliveries.  

Alongside the trade and mobility disruptions, Brussels sought to assure regional states, except Serbia and Kosovo, of its commitment to their EU accession by announcing a $200 million assistance package for infrastructure development and private sector growth. These funds, along with the closure of another accession chapter, reinforced Montenegro’s continued self-branding as the regional frontrunner for EU enlargement. 

Domestically, EU enlargement signaling and EU-related trade and mobility disruptions came amid a tense political landscape: Serbia’s security controversies, high-profile corruption cases in Montenegro and Albania, and Bosnia’s escalating institutional standoff. 

Serbia  

Just prior to exclusion from the EU’s recent financial package, Serbia established an operational team designated for accelerating its EU accession path.  

At the same time, NATO chief Mark Rutte said he expected authorities in Belgrade take accountability for the May 2023 attacks in Banjska and on KFOR soldiers. The attacks remain a large point of tension between Serbia and Kosovo in their mediation process, marking the most direct escalation involving citizens, local security forces, and international forces and resulting in increased KFOR presence and heightened enmity. According to Rutte, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has promised full accountability.  

Taken together, these concessions toward the EU- and NATO-defined order demonstrate that, despite Belgrade’s capitalization on growing tensions between the U.S. and EU/NATO to extend its economic partnership with the U.S., when it comes to fiscal guarantees and state-image projection, remaining in the EU/NATO orbit is still of strategic importance for Serbia. 

Montenegro  

Former Supreme Court Chief Vesna Medenica was convicted of abusing her position to protect a criminal network allegedly led by her son in a first instance ruling. Both Medenica and her son Miloš were sentenced to prison, but the latter escaped from house arrest following his sentence.  

This prompted larger political discord as President Jakov Milatović accused Prime Minister Milojko Spajić of facilitating a government of corrupted institutions controlled by organized crime, calling the PM “frivolous, naïve, and unworthy of the obligations he has undertaken.”  

Once political allies under the “Europe Now!" movement, Milatović and Spajić split in 2024 over debates regarding Spajić’s decision to form a government with pro-Serb and pro-Russian parties, after which Milatović accused him of abandoning the anti-corruption and pro-Western principles of the movement.  

While Milatović’s criticisms toward Spajić are not atypical, such discourse highlights fractures embedded in Montenegro’s politics that risk polarization at the highest level of governance and present a challenge to overall stability. Even as Montenegro is making steady progress toward accession, as demonstrated with this week’s closure of negotiation Chapter 32, Podgorica must reconcile political stability challenges and corruption scandals if it is to actualize its frontrunner status. 

Albania  

Similar political fissures are occurring in Albania as anti-government protests organized by the opposition Democratic Party turned violent. Demonstrators in Tirana threw Molotov cocktails and fireworks at the main government building and were met with tear gas and water cannons by police. 

The protests began amid corruption charges against Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Ballaku, and are sustained by discontent with Prime Minister Edi Rama as he increasingly pushes the limits of executive power.   

Domestic criticism of Rama extended as he met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu this week. Deepening bilateral ties with Israel is representative of a broader shift in Rama’s political strategy toward utilizing the growing rift in U.S.-EU relations to place Albania in a position to achieve maximum concessions, even as it risks internal cohesion, Albania’s strong EU accession status, and domestic fallout. 

Opposition parties are capitalizing on the potential negative consequences of Rama’s maneuvering to simultaneously portray themselves as faithfully adhering to the Western democratic order and to fuel anti-government protests, effectively replicating the consequences of a fracturing international order within Albania’s domestic politics. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina  

A political impasse between Bosnia's two entities is being fueled by growing EU-U.S. divisions.  

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a Resolution on Bosnia and Herzegovina, reiterating the need for constitutional reform of the Dayton Agreement to unify Bosnia’s entities.  

Suggested constitutional reforms and judicial frameworks are often weaponized by Republika Srpska (RS) to garner support for RS separatism. State and constitutional courts are portrayed by RS as politically biased entities, manipulated by foreign influence, that actively work to strip RS of its autonomy through undermining the legal framework put forth by the Dayton Agreement. 

The danger lies in these victim narratives and judicial challenges being legitimized internationally, as seen this week through a visit by former RS President Milorad Dodik, who was ousted for secessionist rhetoric, to Israel and Hungary.  

Dodik utilized meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to emphasize RS’s right to self-determination and confirm Israel’s alignment that the “Dayton Agreement has failed due to the actions of the High Representatives, the BiH Constitutional Court, and the BiH Court.”  

Israeli officials displayed the flag of RS over Bosnia’s flag, which, considering Dodik lacks the mandate to conduct foreign policy, demonstrates Israel’s facilitation of parallel diplomacy that effectively recognizes RS as a separate entity of Bosnia.  

International recognition is important ahead of Dodik’s upcoming visit to Washington, where he said he hopes to use bilateral relations with Israel as “a bridge between Banja Luka and Washington” to capitalize on the U.S. “withdrawal from the EU’s continued anti-Dayton course.”  

Regional Implications  

Domestic fissures are increasing as the region’s external anchors become polarized, leaving more maneuvering space for disadvantaged and opportunistic regional actors. Implications of this range from corruption scandals erupting into larger political fractures, opposition parties capitalizing on political missteps to fuel public discontent, and projected realignment as a means of mobilizing support for secessionist claims.  

Washington must be aware that an increased emphasis on a foreign policy driven by prospective economic partnership over efforts at advancement toward the democratic order comes with the risk of security destabilization in the Western Balkans as countries scramble to ideologically realign themselves with a changing global order.