U.S. Deepens its Energy Foothold in the Western Balkans

This week in the Western Balkans, the United States played a facilitating role in energy and security engagement while regional party-based politics challenged political stability, particularly in Kosovo and Albania.

A multibillion-dollar energy deal to supply Albania with U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) promises Tirana a heightened degree of geopolitical influence in the region. Elisa Spiropali, a senior member of parliament and former foreign minister, challenged Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama on social media, revealing potential intraparty turmoil.

Lawmakers introduced a resolution in the U.S. House advocating for strong support of Kosovo’s integration into NATO even as Kosovo’s political atmosphere challenged its reputation abroad, with acting President Albulena Haxhiu announcing the nation will head to its third snap elections in just over a year on June 7. Meanwhile, a court case exposed an attempt by Serbian intelligence to infiltrate the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.

Serbia continues to deepen defense engagement with Israel following the signing of a security agreement to expedite arms purchases.

Albania

On April 28, Albania, Greece and the United States signed a major regional energy deal. Specifically, a U.S. subsidiary of a Greek company, Aktor LNG USA, and Albania’s state-owned Albgaz signed a $6 billion, 20-year contract to supply Albania with U.S. LNG starting in 2030. Central to the contract is the development of the Vlora Energy Hub aimed at contributing to Albania’s energy diversification and regional connection.

For the U.S., this marks a strategic step toward implementing the Vertical Corridor and comes on the heels of deals signed between the U.S. and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia for the Southern Interconnection Pipeline. Through this deal, the U.S. is attempting to embed itself as a long-term energy guarantor in a region where Russian energy influence has historically shaped economic dependencies and political alignments.

The pace of deals regarding the Vlora Energy Hub and the Southern Interconnection Pipeline indicates that the U.S. has a newfound interest in the Western Balkans energy dynamics and is developing an energy strategy across the region. This interest and the pace of progress suggest the U.S. may view energy infrastructure as a central tool of strategic competition in Europe’s southeastern periphery.

The Southern Interconnection is aimed at reducing Bosnia’s dependency on Russian gas, and the Vlora Energy Hub is expected to turn Albania into a key regional energy exporter. The latter’s complementary project – the Vertical Corridor – is aimed at diversifying energy sources in Central and Southeastern Europe. The Vlora Energy Hub in particular carries significant potential for Albania as it can transform the country into a regional transit hub and therefore widen the scope of Tirana’s political and geopolitical leverage.

Meanwhile, political fragmentation is intensifying within Rama’s Socialist Party of Albania. Spiropali, a senior member of parliament and former foreign minister, directly confronted Rama in a social media post that said: “Expel Me.”

The conflict emerged during a closed-door Socialist Parliamentary Group meeting on April 27 when Rama criticized Spiropali for her recent social media activity and absence from a key vote. Rama gave Spiropali an ultimatum: “Either with us, or against us. The first time you didn’t come to vote, the second time you make a fuss, the third time you’re out of the group.”

The exchange is notable because Rama’s party has often appeared as one of the most cohesive ruling parties in the region. Internal or intraparty dissent in Albania is rarely aired so openly, and thus the public nature of Spiropali’s defiance suggests that internal discipline in the Socialist Party of Albania may be eroding. Crucially, Spiropali’s move represents the strongest criticism against Rama and his rule to emerge from within his own party in years.

If Spiropali’s dissent expands into more visible and more numerous instances of intra-party political fragmentation, the Socialist Party of Albania may struggle in its ability to present a unified front in the future. This, in turn, may be exploited by opposition forces and present an electoral challenge for Rama and his party. Currently, Rama’s position at home is not under serious threat, although the public support for his party has dropped by 6%since the 2025 elections.  Nonetheless, the upcoming local elections in June will test the strength of public support for Rama and his party.

Kosovo

Haxhiu announced that on June 7, Kosovo will head to its third snap elections in just over a year following parliament’s inability to elect a president.

Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s party enjoyed an overwhelming victory in the Dec. 28 snap elections. While this solved the previous obstacles of electing a Cabinet with ethnic-Serb minority representatives, as well as a prime minister, Pristina now remains stalled in naming a president.

Former President Vjosa Osmani left office on April 4 following the constitutional end of her term. Osmani initially dissolved parliament before the Constitutional Court overturned this decision and gave the body 30 days to nominate a president, which it has failed to do. Although Osmani supported Kurti in his election for prime minister, Kurti and his allies did not return the favor. 

While Kurti commands sufficient popular support to win elections, he has demonstrated a consistent unwillingness to build the cross-party consensus that choosing a president demands. Moreover, his sidelining of former ally Osmani indicates that for Kurti, a personal consolidation of power takes precedence over Kosovo’s institutional stability.

Even as this institutional crisis risked undermining Kosovo’s credibility abroad, U.S. lawmakers introduced a resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives advocating strong support for Kosovo’s integration into NATO. The resolution urges Greece, Spain, Slovakia, and Romania, the four remaining NATO members that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, to do so. This presents those countries with the overall objective of safeguarding broader Euro-Atlantic geosecurity.

Domestically, perceptions of Kosovo’s autonomous capabilities continue to be undermined by the backsliding Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, fueled largely by the northern four Kosovar Serb-majority municipalities. This week, the Pristina Basic Court found Jelena Djukanovic, an employee of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s mission in Kosovo, guilty of spying for Serbia, specifically through supplying documents relating to internal security, and political and social situation in those municipalities.

The conviction carries serious political consequences for Kosovo’s international relations. The ability of Serbian intelligence to infiltrate an OSCE mission – an organization designed to support stability and impartiality across Eastern and Southeastern Europe and Central Asia – will challenge Kosovo’s trust in international frameworks. Moreover, this case reinforces a sense of persistent insecurity in the country’s north. It shows that the Serb-majority municipalities remain a conduit for Belgrade’s influence, complicating Kosovo’s sovereignty and stability.

The espionage case adds additional challenges to Kosovo’s already fragile institutions, and its leaders will need to decisively address internal governance challenges if the push for recognition by the four holdout NATO members is to gain traction.

Serbia

The Serbian and Israeli defense ministries signed a security agreement to expedite arms purchases. Serbia’s Parliamentary Security Board approved the “general security agreement on the exchange and mutual protection of classified data in the defense sector,” effectively permitting a provisional application of the agreement before it is finalized by parliament. The agreement will cover “all security and defense” matters and both countries agreed that any disputes will neither be publicly disclosed nor subjected to “any national or international tribunal or court, or any law.”

This agreement most likely comes in relation to a recent move in drone production with Israel’s Elbit Systems, which sold $335 million worth of drones and advanced artillery systems to Serbia in 2025. Since 2023, Serbia’s arms exports to Israel have increased from 3 million euros in 2023 to 114 million euros in 2025.

The agreement’s provision that places the Serbia-Israel arms partnership beyond the reach of legal accountability or democratic oversight is in direct opposition to Serbia’s stated EU integration commitments. Moreover, the significant increase in arms exports to Israel since 2023 indicates that the Serbian-Israeli relationship has evolved rapidly from one of transaction to a substantial strategic partnership. The agreement, along with the strengthening partnership, likely presents a compounding concern for the EU as Serbia deepens ties with a non-EU, non-NATO state while simultaneously seeking to maintain its EU accession path.

While the Serbian government is increasing cooperation with Israel, protesters in Belgrade demanded Serbia withdraw from the Eurovision Song Contest due to Israel’s participation, demonstrating yet another form of domestic discontent with the current regime. Although symbolic, this shows genuine public discomfort with Belgrade’s foreign policy. However, President Aleksandar Vučić and his government seem willing to ignore or absorb these pressures.

Meanwhile, the most recent data from the World Press Freedom Index show notable backsliding in media freedoms across Serbia as well as in Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Kosovo showed slight improvement.

Serbia ranked 104th out of 180 countries on the World Press Freedom Index, declining from its 2025 score of 98. Regionally, Albania’s standing decreased from 70 to 83. Bosnia dropped from 86 to 90, and Montenegro fell from 37 to 41. Kosovo, on the other hand, climbed from 99 to 84.

Notably, Kosovo’s improvement comes at a time when its democratic institutions are under significant stress. This suggests that improvements in the media environment may occur independently of broader political instability. On the other hand, Serbia’s decline reinforces the pattern of democratic erosion under Vučić. Serbia’s downward trend is notable given the scale and persistence of civil society demonstrations.

Regional Implications

U.S. involvement in an energy contract signed in Albania emphasizes Washington’s heightened interest in shaping regional dynamics via tangible infrastructure and energy markets. That said, intensifying fragmentation within the Socialist Party widens the scope of dissent Rama’s leadership currently faces from external party politics and domestic pushback to intra-party discontent. Should this fissure widen, Rama’s leadership could be challenged, leading to either a succession or a broader political realignment in the country.

For Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic partners, its recurrent electoral cycle and stalled dialogue with Serbia are becoming difficult to overlook. A country seeking international recognition as well as NATO and EU memberships cannot present itself as a credible partner and functional democracy while cycling through snap elections as the presidential seat remains vacant. It is likely, therefore, that both Washington and Brussels will seek to increase political pressure on Kurti to prioritize functional governance ahead of the June 7 snap elections.