Milorad Dodik’s Assault on the Bosnian Constitutional Order Explained

The Big Picture: Three months after his conviction by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina for obstructing the implementation of decisions by the Office of the High Representative, and two months after a second set of criminal charges were filed regarding his actions against the country’s constitutional order, the Republika Srpska (RS) entity’s president, Milorad Dodik, not only remains at large, but continues to deepen and escalate the country’s most significant crisis since the end of the Bosnian War in 1995.  

In response to his initial conviction on Feb. 26, Dodik a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, moved to unilaterally block Bosnian state institutions from operating in RS. His actions forced the intervention of the BiH’s Constitutional Court, which struck down the legislation upon which Dodik’s ruling coalition in the RS entity sought to legitimize its actions. The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ordered Dodik’s arrest, along with those of RS Prime Minister Radovan Višković and National Assembly Speaker Nenad Stevandić, for attempting to undermine the country’s constitutional order. Meanwhile, the chief of the country’s state police (SIPA), a Dodik sympathizer, resigned. 

Dodik’s actions have drawn condemnation from U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a bipartisan coalition of U.S. congressional members, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, among others. On April 3, Germany and Austria became the first EU member states to impose sanctions on Dodik – building on existing U.S. and U.K. sanctions – that bar his entry into their countries. Since then, Poland and Lithuania have also imposed entry bans against Dodik and his associates, and other EU states could soon follow.

Dodik has received explicit political and diplomatic backing from Serbia, Hungary, and Russia. While Croatia has nominally condemned his actions, it joined Hungary in openly opposing EU sanctions against him and his regime, thus preventing the bloc from imposing measures.

Insight: Hesitant to serve arrest warrants that could provoke RS police gunfire and the worst Balkan security crisis since 1999, SIPA and EUFOR have left Dodik at large—driving near-unanimous consensus (Budapest and Zagreb excepted) in key EU-NATO capitals and in Sarajevo that only his political removal, not negotiation, can resolve the standoff.

Despite the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s arrest warrant, Dodik, Višković, and Stevandić all remain free. SIPA and EUFOR, the EU’s local peacekeeping force, are still weighing the risks associated with pursuing their capture. Officials in Sarajevo and Brussels fear that if any attempt to detain Dodik were made, he would direct the RS police to fire on both BiH and EUFOR personnel to prevent his arrest, potentially triggering the most serious security crisis in the region since the 1999 Kosovo War. 

Despite Hungarian and Croatian opposition, there is almost perfect consensus in key EU and NATO capitals and in Sarajevo itself, that this crisis can only be resolved through Dodik’s political termination. No negotiation is possible, as leaders in Sarajevo have made clear, after such a categorical violation of the country’s constitutional order and the Dayton Peace Agreement. 

Bottom Line: The Bosnian state has not imploded, and its institutions have mounted a functional, if inefficient, response to Dodik’s putschist gambit. Nonetheless, the inadequacies of the country’s existing constitutional regime cannot be allowed to jeopardize the region’s security. 

A police standoff on April 23 in East Sarajevo presages potentially dramatic ruptures in the country’s security apparatus if the situation is not addressed soon. The inadequacies of the country’s existing constitutional regime have created these conditions, which have jeopardized the region’s collective security. Enforcing the court’s decision with the arrests of Dodik and his allies would alleviate immediate risks of conflict and create the space and momentum for more structural reforms to be initiated.

Additional Reading  

What's behind the political crisis in Bosnia Herzegovina? 

A Dangerous Standoff: The Battle for Bosnia’s Institutions 

Bosnia’s Paradoxical Peace Rests on a Flawed Constitution 
 

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not an official policy or position of the New Lines Institute Western Balkans Center.