Weekly Analysis
Weekly Analysis
WBC Staff
This week, the political environment in the Western Balkans was defined by tensions between democratic capacity and institutional capabilities.
Kosovar President Vjosa Osmani dissolved Parliament following its inability to nominate a president by the March 5 deadline, sparking fears of renewed regional instability amid deepening institutional vulnerabilities following more than a year of political stalemate.
Serbia issued a travel warning on Croatia, citing security concerns for Serbian citizens amid recent reports of “national outbursts” including anti-Serb chants, and attacks involving visitors from Serbia. Given Croatia’s earlier travel warning and Serbia’s reciprocal move, the two countries appear to be entering a diplomatic confrontation that deliberately reinforces mutual sense of insecurity. Even though this confrontation does not reflect the daily reality of cross-country ties, and the risk of regional escalation remains low, a sustained official narrative of threat may reduce space for cooperation. This, in turn, may provide political elites in both countries with an opportunity to mobilize historic and contemporary grievances for domestic and regional gain.
In Montenegro, new security laws evoked internal political controversies threatening EU accession even as the bloc pushed to accelerate the country’s integration. Albania, meanwhile, saw generally positive reviews from Brussels at the 17th Subcommittee meeting on Justice, Freedom and Security. The positive reviews happened despite domestic unrest and claims by the ruling Socialist Party that it will reject requests from the country’s independent judicial body to lift former Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Ballaku’s immunity following a corruption investigation that’s prompted violent antigovernment protests.
President Osmani dissolved the Parliament following its failure to elect a presidential candidate, sending Kosovo to its third snap election since February 2025.
Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s ruling party, Vetevendosje, failed to rally enough opposition MPs to achieve the two-thirds majority (80 votes) necessary to elect its candidate, Foreign Minister Glauk Konjufca, despite Vetevendosje’s overwhelming victory in the December 2025 snap elections.
Kosovo’s political stalemate reflects the political standoff between Osmani and Kurti that is increasingly proving detrimental to the health of Kosovo’s democratic endeavors. Vetevendosje said it plans to challenge Osmani’s dissolution by appealing to the Constitutional Court, while Osmani called for constitutional reforms to have the president be elected directly.
Recurring snap elections risk democratic disillusionment and further weaken Kosovo’s desired international presence, with procedural mechanics taking precedence over governance imperatives, and in some instances becoming weaponized by executives competing for power.
Serbia issued a warning against travel to Croatia, placing it on the level 3 “orange list” of countries that should be visited only “in cases of extreme necessity,” citing “increased incidents, tensions and unfavorable security conditions.”
The Croatian Foreign Ministry responded on X: “Croatia is a member of the EU, NATO and the Schengen area, and according to Eurostat is one of the safest countries in Europe.”
Serbia’s travel warning is tied explicitly to identity-based political hostility as the government warned its citizens to take precautions with mass gatherings, nationalist symbolism and Serbian license plates. Because Croatia issued a travel warning in December 2025, Serbia’s move can be read as reciprocal diplomatic signal in an already deteriorated relationship between the two countries.
Even as the two countries attempt to reinforce the narrative of mutual insecurity, they overstate the reality of daily life and cross-country ties which remain more secure and resilient than the official rhetoric suggests.
Despite the currently low probability of this diplomatic confrontation posing a significant threat to regional stability, the sustained narrative of mutual insecurity may shrink the space for cooperation. In turn, political elites from both Croatia and Serbia may opt to mobilize these grievances into domestic and regional gain at the expense of the other.
Montenegro
Montenegro adopted amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs and a new law on the National Security Agency. Passage of the legislation intensified controversy surrounding potential risks to the rule of law application and Montenegro’s EU accession process.
Amid the push for the country to become the first Western Balkans nation admitted to the EU, emphasized by EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos’ announcement that negotiations on Montenegro’s Accession Treaty with the European Union will soon begin, internal political fragmentation is emerging. Specifically, the ruling party claimed the reforms were necessary for the country to close its final benchmarks for EU accession. However, in reality, the EC explicitly acknowledged that adoption of the law on the National Security Agency is not required to close Chapter 24, but rather Montenegro must ensure all amendments to Montenegro’s Law on Internal Affairs be harmonized with EU legislation and international standards.
In retaliation, opposition parties accused the government of attempting to expand control over the security sector. Members of the opposition Democratic Party of Socialists, currently holding the positions of deputy parliament speaker, Committee for Comprehensive Electoral Reform co-chair, and chairs of the Committee on European Integration, and the Committee on Anti-Corruption, threatened to resign following the adoption of the amendments. Resignations would challenge Montenegro’s political capacity by weakening governance legitimacy, slowing legislative progress, threatening political and civil polarization, and increasing both the international and domestic perceptions of internal turmoil.
The consequences are significant. This week the EU noted that while candidates may be admitted to the EU more quickly than before, they may also face restrictions on membership, such as suspending veto power if new members violate fundamental EU values, especially the rule of law. Such restrictions are based on “important lessons learned from previous enlargements,” most likely referring to Hungary, which has increasingly deviated from Brussels’ norms by systematically dismantling democratic institutions, undermining judicial independence, and boycotting sanctions on Russia.
The EU is moving forward with accession cautiously, which could prompt heightened frustration and disillusionment with the process, especially worrisome amid emerging internal conflicts surrounding rule of law in frontrunner countries like Montenegro, which run directly counter to EU accession requirements.
As such, the political fragmentation occurring in Montenegro should serve as a cautionary tale for Brussels, in which promises of forthcoming accession could simultaneously prompt internal weakening of institutions that does more harm than good.
Prime Minister Edi Rama’s ruling Socialist Party announced it will not support requests from Special Prosecution Against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) to lift Ballaku’s immunity, despite removing her from her position as deputy prime minister last week amid a corruption probe.
Rama claimed that SPAK “sentenced her without a trial, sentenced her without giving her the right to defend herself in court over what she is accused of, and they want to see Belinda Balluku in prison without even waiting for the courtroom door to open.” Such statements directly put pressure on the judicial system and challenge both legal and political legitimacy, which could lead to potential confrontation between branches and reduced public confidence.
Significantly against this backdrop, the EU reviewed Albania’s progress on rule of law, justice reform, and security cooperation. The review said that “encouraging results were noted by the Commission in the fight against corruption, with the specialized bodies, including SPAK, continuing to deliver in several cases of high-level corruption.” Open contestation of rule of law, judicial pressure from the executive, and continuing antigovernment protests run directly counter to such findings, threatening Albania’s EU position.
The test will be how Montenegro's prospects for entering formal EU negotiation treaty will motivate Albania to reform its internal and domestic state of turmoil. Concurrently, this could serve as a tension point, motivating opposition parties to further anti-government protests in hopes of pressuring reform.
The potential start of Montenegro’s treaty negotiations shows the EU is making progress on its regional promises, which are even more crucial amid emerging rule of law contests, Kosovo’s governance gridlock, and rising Serbia-Croatia regional tensions. That said, the potential for reforms to new membership could inflame disillusionment and domestic political power competitions, which, considering the vulnerability radiating from Kosovo’s continued political impasse, compounds concern for regional conflict renewal.
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