Western Balkans’ Triple Strain: Wartime Legacy, Rule of Law and EU Accession

Between Feb. 17-23, 2026, political dynamics in the Western Balkans clustered around EU accession bargaining, memory and identity politics, and rule-of-law contestation.

Serbia openly floated the idea of partial EU membership focused solely on single-market access. This departs from President Aleksandar Vučić’s earlier pledge to lead Serbia into full EU membership – a pledge that helped Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party consolidate power after 2012. It also signals a more transactional approach to EU integrations that could afford Serbia economic benefits without full political conditionality tied to reforms.

At the same time, open contestation around the rule of law and anti-corruption were dominant themes in Albania and North Macedonia’s local political dynamics. North Macedonia saw two senior resignations amid corruption allegations, while Albania’s mass demonstration over Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Balluku’s corruption probe continued. Opposition protestors openly clashed with police in Tirana while demanding the government’s resignation. 

Kosovo’s politics were shaped by wartime legacy and questions of status. At the inaugural meeting of U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace in Washington, Kosovar President Vjosa Osmani was not given the floor to speak, potentially signaling Kosovo’s continued diplomatic limitations despite access and participation. At home, mass rallies took place in Pristina in support of former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) figuresfacing war crimes trials in The Hague, including former President Hashim Thaci.  

Serbia  

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić commented that Serbia would be open to partial membership in the European Union without veto rights. He said, “The most important aspect for us is the internal market as well as the free flow of goods, people, and capital. These are the central values that we want to achieve with EU membership." 

Such explicit acknowledgement that Serbia’s primary EU motivations are economically driven overlooks the democratic and rule-of-law reforms prioritized by EU accession guidelines. That said, concerns with Serbia’s economic partnerships persist. 

Particularly, increases in opaque Chinese investments continue to be met with domestic pushback. A 2009 agreement between China and Serbia allows for direct public contracting with Chinese firms, which gives Beijing priority for investments, often at the expense of quality regulations.

Currently, plans for a $2.8 billion oil refinery backed by Chinese state-owned companies are facing pushback from residents of Smederevo, a Serbian industrial city. While such initiatives would diversify Serbia’s oil sector away from Russian oil – in alignment with Europe’s own energy goals – such pushback isn’t isolated. Instead, it is representative of the larger-scale protests the country has been enduring for over a year. This week, police were accused of “chasing down and arresting” student protesters, triggering violent outbreaks.

As protests continue, other sectors of civil society are getting involved. The Serbian Orthodox Church Synod suspended Archbishop and Metropolitan Justin of Žica for supporting student protestors in Serbia. Integration of such domestic censorship into sociocultural spheres directly opposes the democratic reforms needed for EU accession, signaling de-alignment from Brussels extending beyond governance institutions.

Thus, while Vučić states that Serbia would be complacent with partial EU membership, this request should be seen as a continuation of Belgrade’s geoeconomic maneuvering.  

Kosovo 

While in Washington for the inaugural Board of Peace meeting, Kosovar President Vjosa Osmani was not given the floor to speak, despite reports that she previously received a letter confirming she would. President Osmani's advisor, Bekim Kupina, dismissed the episode as a scheduling issue, saying the event ran over time and 15 other countries likewise did not get the floor.

The episode is best understood as a reminder of Kosovo’s constrained diplomatic standing even while present at high-level diplomatic forums. The fact that President Trump publicly referenced his role in “solving the Serbia-Kosovo conflict” and called for President Osmani to stand in acknowledgement underscores Kosovo’s position as a symbol in a great power narrative rather than an equal agenda-setter in its own dispute. 

The lack of floor time may also reflect Washington’s deliberate decision to tread carefully with Russia, and to a lesser extent, Serbia. Neither country recognizes Kosovo’s statehood, and both remain sensitive to any moves that appear to elevate Kosovo’s status, particularly in high-level diplomatic settings.

At the same time, Kosovo’s domestic politics centered on its wartime legacy and war crimes trials in The Hague. In Pristina, large rallies expressed support for former KLA figures, including former President Hashim Thaci, whose war crimes trial at the Specialist Chambers in The Hague has entered its final stage. As tens of thousands of Kosovars marched in support of the KLA and in defiance of the Specialist Chambers, they were joined by President Osmani, who described the trials as “unfair”.

The size and intensity of the Pristina rallies underscore the persistent centrality of Kosovo’s wartime legacy in the political landscape. As the Specialist Chambers nears the verdicts, Kosovo may be heading toward a legitimacy clash between an external legal process and a dominant narrative at home.

If war crimes convictions and long sentences come, most Kosovars will read them as a judgment on the KLA’s role in Kosovo’s statehood, rather than individual criminal liability. Kosovo’s ruling elite is itself invested in the KLA legacy and may have a strong incentive to defend the “innocence” and “liberation” narratives despite the potential for diplomatic damage. A sustained rhetoric against the Specialist Chambers and its legal processes may strain Kosovo’s relationship with key partners who back the court, and further complicate the country’s relationship with Serbia. A hardened position in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue will significantly shrink room for compromise and increase the risk of bilateral security escalation. 

The upcoming verdict days will also likely lead to Kosovars mass mobilizing, and politicians may struggle to contain demonstrations they tacitly support. Both President Osmani and Prime Minister Albin Kurti will be compelled to defend national dignity without inflaming the public or isolating Kosovo abroad. Kosovo is heading towards a difficult legitimacy test that can turn into a domestic and diplomatic crisis at the same time. 

Albania 

While President Osmani may have been denied speaking time at the inaugural Board of Peace meeting, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama took up Kosovo’s cause, using his time to draw attention to both the Kosovo-Serbia conflict and war crimes trials in The Hague. 

He acknowledged President Trump’s leadership in his first term, bringing Kosovo and Serbia close to a final peace agreement before turning the conversation to the former President of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci. Thaci, who is undergoing a trial at The Hague, may be sentenced to up to 45 years in prison, as per the prosecution’s demands. 

Prime Minister Rama called out several states in attendance, accusing them of sponsoring such action against Thaci, while stating they “should be ashamed by that type of international justice,” as the court is “failing at every step to uphold standards of democratic justice”. Prime Minister Rama subsequently asked President Trump to do something before “very bad things happen again.” 

Such discourse shows continued posturing toward the United States, as well as deepening engagement with, and support of, Kosovo. It also demonstrates Albania’s bid for regional agenda-setting, as the country attempts to position itself as a normative advocate for Kosovo in a venue where Kosovo’s own speaking capacity is limited.

While Prime Minister Rama focused on Albania’s diplomatic engagement in Washington, confrontations over domestic rule of law continued to intensify in Tirana. Protests against Belinda Balluku, Prime Minister Rama’s deputy, have persisted since December 2025, when Albania’s special persecution office (SPAK) launched a corruption probe against her. The intensity and persistence of demonstrations are becoming a significant challenge for Prime Minister Rama’s position and his government’s plan to bring Albania to full EU membership by 2030.

Prime Minister Rama has been steadfast in his defense of Balluku. He refused to accept Balluku’s resignation offers, opposed the removal of her detention immunity, and accused the SPAK of overreach. Rama plans to amend the law to protect ministers from suspension during criminal investigations.

As demonstrations persist demanding the government’s resignation, the Balluku case is becoming a decisive test of Albania’s anti-corruption capabilities. This is the exact type of rule-of-law credibility that is paramount to the EU in its enlargement processes. Prime Minister Rama’s approach to Balluku’s probe could substantially push Albania’s EU membership timeline and become a decisive issue at the 2029 parliamentary elections if anti-corruption becomes a sustained campaign liability. The 2029 vote is set to occur less than a year before Prime Minister Rama’s pledged 2030 EU accession deadline, which raises the political costs of reform slippage and interference with courts’ corruption probes. 

North Macedonia 

North Macedonia saw high-level resignations linked to corruption controversies and criminal allegations. The Parliament confirmed the resignations of Marko Bislimoski, the head of the Energy Regulatory Commission, and Cveta Ristovska, a member of the State Commission of the Prevention of Corruption and Conflict of Interest. 

Bislimoski resigned following a criminal complaint regarding alleged abuse of office, which was filed by the Financial Police, while Ristovska resigned following public controversy surrounding two anti-corruption cases filed against her. 

The two cases indicate functioning institutional mechanisms that ensure the rule of law, a vital prerequisite for North Macedonia’s EU accession path. Yet, the Bislimosku and Ristovska cases also show that two vital institutions remain vulnerable to corruption – an institution meant to regulate the energy market, and an institution meant to police corruption and conflicts of interest.

To keep its EU accession path alive, North Macedonia must demonstrate strong institutional capacity beyond mere responsiveness to senior resignations. For Brussels, the ultimate test in the Bislimosku and Ristovskacases is whether North Macedonia can hold transparent investigations while enacting due legal processes and institutional changes that would prevent repeat or reverberating controversies in the very institutions meant to police corruption. 

Regional Implications 

The week of Feb. 17 to 23 underscored the chronic crisis of domestic political legitimacy across several Western Balkan states. 

Albania’s Balluku probe and persistent violent protests in Tirana show that anti-corruption enforcement is becoming a substantial legitimacy test threatening the incumbent government's political future and the country’s external alignment and aspirations. Meanwhile, North Macedonia illustrated a similar problem in a different form. Senior resignations amid corruption charges simultaneously exposed institutional fragility and a capacity to hold officials accountable. Kosovo’s limited diplomatic capacity abroad, set against the centrality of wartime legacy domestically, shows that the country may be heading toward a risky legitimacy test.

These developments point to increased odds of region-wide political turbulence in the coming weeks and months. With KLA war crimes verdicts likely to inflame Kosovo’s public and strain the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, Serbia may seek to exploit any sign of escalation in Brussels and Washington by casting Kosovo as a regional destabilizer.