Limitations of Turkey’s Western Balkans Policy Since Erdoğan’s Reelection

This report is part of the larger anthology “Western Balkans 2023: Assessment of Internal Challenges and External Threats”

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Reuf Bajrović scrutinizes Turkey’s “neo‑Ottoman” outreach to the Western Balkans under Erdoğan, arguing it remains strategic posturing without substance. Post–Cold War, Turkey largely ignored the Balkans—even amidst the horrors of Bosnia—unable to project power beyond symbolic diplomacy .

With Erdoğan’s rise and economic resurgence came ideological reinvigoration: cultural conservatism fused with Ottoman nostalgia. Turkey aspired to extend its influence beyond immediate neighbors into broader regions—but in the Balkans, that ambition faltered. Investments focused on cultural heritage and symbolic partnerships, notably with parties like Bosnia’s SDA—ideologically aligned with Erdoğan’s AKP—but failed to transition into meaningful infrastructure or security engagement .

In contrast, U.S./EU strategic preemption in key Muslim‑majority Balkan states—particularly Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania—has undercut Turkish influence. Western actors imposed political decrees in Bosnia and issued veiled threats to Kosovo’s status, while Albania aligned firmly with the U.S./EU camp. Geography also constrains Istanbul: limited or denied naval access has prevented a naval foothold.

Bajrović concludes: despite rhetorical ambition, Turkey’s role in the Western Balkans remains underpowered and symbolic, while Western containment policies have rendered the ball squarely in Turkey’s court—testing whether Erdoğan is willing—or able—to enter the regional fray more decisively.