Opinion
Serbia’s Energy and Resource Gambit
Carly Brant - 21 Aug 2025
Opinion
Carly Brant
Student Fellow, New Lines Institute
On July 21, Serbia announced a joint pipeline initiative with Hungary. While the infrastructure itself is uncontentious, the pipeline is set to transport up to 5 million tons of Russian oil annually via the Russian-owned Druzhba route. The announcement follows trilateral talks among Serbia, Hungary, and Russia, signaling deepening energy cooperation between the three while the European Union is seeking to phase out such imports and tighten sanctions on Russia.
Concurrently, Serbia’s contested Jadar mine illustrates Belgrade’s capacity to weaponize strategic resources in its geopolitical balancing act. Although the mine is formally linked to Western investment, the civil protests—claimed to be facilitated by Russian disinformation campaigns—have repeatedly stalled actionable cooperation, which creates an opening for potential Chinese involvement under the Belt and Road initiative.
These developments reveal Serbia’s deliberate strategy of maneuvering between Russia and China to maximize autonomy while extracting concessions from Brussels. The result is a dual challenge for the EU: Serbia’s continuation of Russian energy dependence that undermines sanctions unity, and resource politics that could anchor Chinese influence at the heart of the Union’s green transition.
Serbia’s balancing act highlights a broader vulnerability in the EU’s enlargement policy—its inability to prevent candidate states from using external partnerships to evade reform demands necessary for accession.
Serbia’s choice to engage in a Moscow-facilitated pipeline contradicts key EU energy goals, particularly those aimed at reducing dependency on Russian fossil fuels and accelerating the transition to green energy. Most notably, it openly defies the EU’s REPowerEU goal, which strives to phase out Russian oil by 2027.
Engagement with Hungary is especially worrisome amid the EU's recent approval of its 18th sanctions package targeting Russia’s energy sector. Hungary and Slovakia initially vetoed the latest EU sanctions due to their reliance on Russian oil. Such alignment threatens Serbia’s EU membership bid by covertly signaling a deviation from faithful Western integration.
The pipeline also highlights Serbia’s divergence from the requirements outlined in EU accession negotiations. In December 2021, Serbia opened EU Negotiating Cluster 4—also known as the "Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity”—which outlines four chapters to implement for its accession goals related to transport, energy, trans-European networks, environmental protection, and climate change.
Most significantly, under this outline, Serbia is expected to address Russia’s majority ownership of Serbia’s national oil industry (Sr. Naftna Industrija Srbije – NIS), and the dependence on the state-owned Russian natural gas producer, Gazprom. As of June 30, PJSC Gazprom Neft and PJSC Gazprom own 44.85% and 11.3% of NIS, respectively, amounting to 56.15% Russian ownership in Serbia’s oil industry. This marks a 5% increase since Serbia sold the majority stake in its oil and gas company to Gazprom in 2008. Serbia’s oil industry today is roughly as Russian-owned as in 2022, directly following the opening of Cluster 4 negotiations.
This ownership does not change with the Druzhba link, but the policy risk does: supply routes and equity control together heighten Serbia’s sanctions fragility and the EU’s collective-action costs. Moreover, the planned pipeline deepens Serbia’s reliance on Russian oil and contradicts EU accession requirements outlined in Cluster 4. Thus, entering a pipeline initiative with Russia and Hungary highlights Serbia’s geostrategic maneuvering between Western integration and Eastern alliance, revealing broader inefficiencies in the EU’s strategy to mitigate external energy influences.
Serbia’s tendency toward Eastern alignment, which weakens the fulfillment of the EU’s desired energy goals, is also evident in the country’s contested lithium mine. Securing Serbia’s Jadar mine—a critical raw mineral reserve with substantial lithium and borate deposits—is essential for the EU’s green energy transition. Notably, the Critical Raw Minerals Act, outlined under the EU’s Green Industrial Plan, relies on lithium.
Serbia’s Jadar mine has the potential to supply up to 90% of Europe’s lithium requirements to facilitate its green energy transition and electric vehicle battery production. However, due to the EU’s emphasis on Serbia maintaining strict alignment with accession plans rather than looking toward strategic economic and energy partnerships with the country, the EU has ultimately failed to secure a strong enough deal regarding the mine.
The EU’s failure to secure a solid deal with the Jadar mine has ultimately benefited China. Currently, the EU is heavily dependent on importing batteries from China to support its EV manufacturing industry. Recent tariffs and supply chain disruptions underscore this reliance and present the criticality of finding other sources.
Serbia’s lithium reserve has the potential to facilitate Europe’s transition to EV production away from China. The resulting criticality of the Jadar mine gives Serbia the leverage to successfully maneuver between the demands of Western democratic integration and facile economic opportunity presented to it by actors like Russia and China to enhance its geopolitical position.
As China increasingly expresses economic interest in Serbia as a part of its Belt and Road Initiative, the EU securing a deal becomes even more imperative. Further deepening cooperation between Serbia and China can be seen with the July 18-29 joint military exercises, and “leaked files” recently obtained by Radio Free Europe, revealing that Serbia is “secretly” expanding its use of Chinese surveillance systems.
China’s involvement poses a risk of advancing regional destabilization and derailing overall EU energy goals through the introduction of yet another ideological and economic competitor into the European sphere of influence. Given Serbia’s decision to align with Hungary and Moscow on a pipeline initiative, the EU cannot risk Chinese involvement and should make it a priority to plan and procure an incentivizing deal to gain access to the Jadar mine in the near future.
Serbian geopolitical maneuvering involving Russia is dangerous to European geopolitical stability and prosperity. Russia has historically capitalized on destabilization and conflict in the Western Balkans. This further diverts the region from EU democratic norms and allows Russia to extend its influence in Europe, despite EU sanctions.
On May 9, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić notably defied EU warnings and attended Russia’s Victory Day parade in Moscow. Amid ongoing domestic protests calling for snap elections, this highlights a tendency for Serbian leadership to turn toward Moscow during times of conflict. In fact, Moscow has reciprocally reaffirmed support for Vučić as these protests turn increasingly violent.
Similarly, both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Hungarian President Viktor Orban maintain close relationships with the pro-separatist leader of Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik. In light of Dodik’s recent conviction—which converted his prison sentence into a fine, stripped him of his presidential title, and barred him from politics for six years—this support dangerously provides a false sense of international validation for the persistence of illegal successionist mobilization.
Serbian democratic backsliding further presents the dangers of Russian interference. Serbia has been a candidate for EU membership since 2012, and the country has made some progress toward that goal. However, enduring concerns over the state of democratic institutions, media freedom, and human rights, the ongoing nationwide protests, and Belgrade’s foreign policy alignment with Russia have significantly slowed accession negotiations.
Rising tensions between the EU and Hungary—including Budapest’s refusal to fully align with the EU’s position on Ukraine, frozen funds, and concerns over democratic standards—generate further skepticism of Serbian faithful alignment with EU values while deepening ties with Hungary.
The pipeline exemplifies yet another way for Moscow to covertly cement its influence in Europe by demonstrating its willingness to provide infrastructural support for its allies. As a result, Serbian energy collaboration with Hungary risks broader regional destabilization by inviting hostile state actors—such as Russia and China—into the European energy sphere.
While the Vučić administration notably signed a tentative critical minerals deal with the EU in July 2024, it is not strong enough to deter Russian influence and guarantee Serbian re-prioritization of EU accession goals, as evidenced by the Serbian-Hungarian pipeline initiative.
Domestic pushback in the form of protests regarding mining has resurfaced. Rio Tinto, the development group in charge of the mine, claims these protests are the result of a shadowy disinformation campaign. Given Russia’s history of disinformation in Serbia, and the broader Balkan region, there is increasing belief that Moscow is behind these campaigns, further demonstrating the EU’s shortcomings in deterring Russian influence in European energy affairs.
To secure an adequate energy deal with Serbia, the EU needs to address the root causes of the Kremlin’s continued influence in the country. This should be done by enhancing public trust in the EU through a transparent outlining of EU energy goals, especially those relating to the Jadar mine.
Additionally, increased partnership through energy deals that allow Serbia to maintain autonomy while working under EU guidance will offer an effective counterbalance to Hungary's undermining of EU initiatives and prevent Serbia from falling deeper into Russian influence.
The Serbian-Hungarian pipeline exemplifies Serbia’s parallel engagement with both the EU and state actors hostile to the Union. Ultimately, these partnerships demonstrate broader inefficiencies within the EU in extending its energy goals and mitigating Russian influence in the Western Balkans, all of which are of critical importance if Serbia is to continue its quest faithfully toward EU accession.