Electoral and Corruption Crises Collide with Hungary-Serbia Alignment

Friction between executive and judicial branches is sharpening into open confrontation across the Western Balkans, brought to light by recent elections and corruption scandals.  

These disputes reveal a broader pattern of executive testing of the outer limits of judicial tolerance, raising renewed concerns about the strength of institutional checks and balances. The pattern is particularly evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo, where executives are colliding with courts in post-conflict and EU-accession settings meant to consolidate the rule of law. The erosion of the judiciary in these states ultimately weakens the region’s remaining guardrails against authoritarian drift and destabilizing hard-power contests.  Such patterns also open space for Hungary to elevate its position as a regional actor through solidifying support for subversive executives. 

Albania

Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama’s refusal to replace Deputy PM Belinda Ballaku, who was dismissed on corruption charges in late November by Albania’s independent judicial force organized to target corruption, Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK), claiming the suspension to be “a brutal act of interference in the independence of the executive branch,” undermines judicial authority. More precisely, by recasting judicial scrutiny as an attack on the executive’s democratic mandate, Rama may be seeking to personalize power while formally staying within constitutional rules. 

Rama warned of taking Ballaku’s dismissal to the Constitutional Court, claiming the charges set “a unique and dangerous precedent” for executive powers. In response, Albania’s Judges Association accused Rama of putting pressure on the court. This exchange points to an imbalance between an assertive executive with strong political capital and judicial actors that remain institutionally weaker in public confrontations. 

Despite the country recently opening its final cluster of negotiations for EU accession, Rama’s persistence in anchoring himself in Albanian politics vis-à-vis rhetoric that undermines judicial review prompts concern for Albania’s democratic direction. 

Kosovo

The Central Election Commission refused to accredit the Belgrade-backed Srpska Lista party for parliamentary elections, prompting disappointment from Kosovo’s Western allies. Undercutting minority representation gives Belgrade an easy pretext to question the election’s legitimacy and puts Kosovo at odds with the U.S. and EU partners backing its statehood. 

The previous two times the Srpska Lista’s application was rejected by the CEC, the party won an appeal at the Elections Complaints and Appeals Panel. However, caretaker Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s Vetevendosje party spearheaded the rejections, inducing concern for political maneuvering with the goal of artificially consolidating power and undermining the democratic process. Excluding a major Serb party could deepen mistrust among Kosovo Serbs, trigger new boycotts, and weaken the claim that Kosovo’s institutions offer a genuinely democratic alternative to Belgrade’s influence. 

Kurti’s waning popularity is demonstrated by Vetevendosje’s two-time failure to form a government, which is now pushing Kosovo into snap elections in December, while his hardline stance on Serbia has not translated into stable majority support. The combination of parliamentary deadlock and confrontational rhetoric risks further polarizing Kosovo’s politics and eroding public trust in its institutions. 

Further contributing to tensions is the recent swearing-in of Serb mayors in Kosovo’s northern municipalities, which is seen as a “retaking of power” for Serbs following a period of political boycotts due to Pristina’s policies toward the Serb minority. The deepening political divide between Kosovo’s north and the rest of the country keeps the area vulnerable to new flashpoints among local Serb leaders, Kosovo institutions, and Belgrade. 

Regional Implications 

As institutional tensions build, Hungary seeks to assert itself as a key regional player through building allyship with executive leaders increasingly under fire at home.  

In Bosnia, a plane carrying Hungary’s foreign minister was denied landing in Banja Luka due to Budapest’s open support for separatist acts initiated by Dodik that undermined Bosnia’s sovereignty. With a fragmented external posture where different domestic actors can send competing foreign policy signals to the same partner state, Bosnia’s sovereignty has become a diplomatic battleground that foreign, illiberal actors can exploit. 

Similarly, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán met with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to discuss the possibility of acquiring the majority Russian-owned NIS oil company following U.S. sanctions. Orban has strengthened relations with Vučić as the ongoing protests erode the Serbian president’s popularity, and such prospective financial support underscores Budapest’s growing regional influence, which could complicate the EU’s ability to use energy as leverage in the Western Balkans.  

Budapest’s continued effort to position itself as a patron of embattled executives is evidence of the existence of illiberal support inside the EU. Budapest is effectively offering such leaders an external sponsor when they resist rule-of-law pressures from Brussels and Washington, thus weakening Western leverage over democratic and judicial reforms.