Serbia is Leveraging a Divided West

Between Jan. 13-19, Serbia dominated narrative space in the Western Balkans. President Aleksandar Vučić’s growing confidence in explicitly criticizing the Western order is leading to fragmented responses from the United States and EU that allow Belgrade to continue its geopolitical maneuvering. 

In Kosovo, the potential for continued political stasis from delayed vote certification could heighten the perceived threat from Serbia’s increased escalatory rhetoric and defense posturing, as drones were suspected of entering from Serbian territory above Novo Selo but later were claimed by NATO’s KFOR troops. 

At the same time, the United States is taking an active role in procuring energy infrastructure to mitigate Russian hard power influence, demonstrated by its oversight on a near deal with Hungary’s oil group MOL to acquire Russian stake in Serbia’s leading oil and gas company. Another show of oversight was seen in a recent meeting of U.S. investors in Bosnia and Herzegovina to facilitate infrastructure that would connect Bosnia to Croatia’s portion of the Southern Interconnection gas pipeline. 

Considering connecting with Croatia is significant given the recent announcement by the Bosnian Presidency that it will use all legal and diplomatic measures against Croatia to prevent the construction of a radioactive waste disposal facility at the countries’ border, underscoring the vitality for regional integration and cooperative environmental and energy measures.

Serbia-U.S. Relations 

Serbia is the only Western Balkans country not named on the United States’ list of countries affected by the pause on immigrant visas. That said, Vučić was the only regional leader to denounce U.S. action in Venezuela, utilizing the event to raise the escalation scale toward Kosovo, and to amplify Belgrade’s deteriorating Western alignment. 

Excluding Serbia may be an attempt to placate Belgrade as the Trump administration is currently utilizing punitive economic oversight to target Russia’s influence in the country. Specifically, Hungary's oil group MOL is reported to be close to an agreement to acquire Russian stake in Serbia's leading oil and gas company, Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), following U.S. sanctions on NIS as a means of targeting Russia’s energy sector. Russia’s Gazprom and Gazprom Neft own 11.3% and 44.9% of NIS each, while the Serbian government has a 29.9% stake. Presently, any agreement signed between NIS and a new stakeholder requires U.S. approval, constraining Washington to deter any tension with Belgrade as a means of safeguarding this oversight. 

Thus, while appeasing Belgrade, the United States is disproportionately favoring an embattled and divisive executive like Vučić, which communicates that dealignment comes with concessions. Coming from a nation as influential as the United States, this symbolically validates Serbia’s intensifying defense posturing, giving Belgrade an opportunity to maneuver the rules-based system that its regional counterparts are resolutely working toward. 

Serbia-EU Relations 

The EU similarly might be making concessions to appease Belgrade as the European Commission decided to partially release funds from the Growth Plan, despite Vučić’s refusal to meet with Members of the European Parliament, describing them as “haters of Serbia” and calling them “uninvited” to scheduled meetings taking place Jan. 22-24. 

Specifically, 61.1 million of the 112-million-euro disbursement will be distributed for the completion of three out of seven reform steps: aligning visa regime, introducing the 5G network, and integrating the electricity market. It should be noted that China’s Huawei is a key partner in Serbia’s largest internet service provider, the state-owned Telekom Srbija that facilitated the 5G rollout. Beijing remains integral to Serbia’s energy sector, demonstrating that these “achievements” were made through a contentious partnership. 

As the United States is offering diplomatic appeasement to maintain its coercive economic oversight targeting Serbian malalignment, the EU is essentially offering monetary rewards for explicit insults and half-baked reform efforts achieved through a reviled partnership. Such disjointed efforts ultimately countervail any attempt to derail Belgrade’s geopolitical maneuvering.

Kosovo 

Reports of two suspicious drones allegedly entering Kosovo from Serbian territory circulated before the activity was claimed by NATO’s KFOR. The drones entered above Novo Selo, a site of geopolitical tension between Serbia and Kosovo as both countries have planned military bases there. 

Concerns about irregularity in the first count of Kosovo’s snap-parliamentary elections in December prompted the Central Election Commission’s to order a recount of 36 percent of ballot boxes. This will delay the final certification of the election result, which risks extending Kosovo’s governance crisis.

The setback enhances Kosovo’s vulnerability to Serbia’s rhetorical and security escalations through straining political cooperation, eliciting public dissatisfaction, hindering readiness, and serving as potential fuel to reinforce Serbian territorial integrity narratives.   

Bosnia and Herzegovina 

The three-member Bosnian Presidency unanimously announced it was ready to use all legal and diplomatic means, including international litigation, against the Republic of Croatia regarding a plan to build a radioactive waste disposal facility, which is set to begin operations in 2028 near Bosnia’s border.

In December 2025, Croatia’s Parliament passed a law enabling the construction of a radioactive waste facility near the Bosnian border as a means of fulfilling its obligations to Slovenia for disposing of half of the radioactive waste generated by the co-owned Krško Nuclear Power Plant, which began operating when both countries were part of Yugoslavia.

Regional Implications