Serbia’s Defense Posturing Triggers Fears of Regional Escalation

This week, political dynamics in the Western Balkans centered on increased security posturing from Serbia set against energy difficulties and deepening of institutional weaknesses. 

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama published a joint text advocating EU accession without veto. This shows regional reordering and convergence of two once ideologically opposed actors when it comes to accession, revealing that adoption of a multi-vector foreign policy might be more favorable than faithful alignment toward EU rules-based order, especially as Washington seems to be emphasizing transactional foreign policy.  

While Serbia and Albania cooperated on external relations, they remained at odds regionally. Serbia’s purchase of Chinese weaponry, alongside Vučić’s claim that Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo are waiting for an opportune moment to attack Serbia, hint at Belgrade’s defense posturing amid further political fractures in Albania and Kosovo. 

Serbia 

Serbia acquired Chinese CM-400AKG ballistic missiles, which were then integrated into MiG-29 fighter aircraft. This marks Europe’s first military aircraft with hypersonic capabilities, not only demonstrating Belgrade’s continued dependence on China for military acquisition but also contributing to fears of regional escalation. 

In reference to the military cooperation among Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo, Vučić said, “They are waiting for a favorable moment. We are preparing for their attack.” Following Serbia’s issuance of a travel advisory on Croatia, Kosovo’s increased vulnerabilities amid inability to constitute a government, and growing discontent with the Rama government and internal political fragmentation in Albania, Vučić may be returning to security posturing as a means of antagonizing regional escalation or simply to distract from the domestic discontent confronting his own political legitimacy. 

The risk of an Albania-Croatia-Kosovo military offensive is low. Albania and Kosovo are facing political crises that limit their ability to launch coordinated military action, much less action that would not trigger public backlash. 

Serbia is increasing its military capabilities. At the beginning of the year, Vučić claimed the country would double its defense spending in the next 18 months and said compulsory would resume in December 2026 or early 2027. Serbia is the top arms importer in the region, and in June 2025 it halted all arms exports. These actions indicate Belgrade is stockpiling military resources, raising regional security concerns, especially as it deepens defense support from China, continually rejects joining NATO, and Vučić makes claims of a “dying world order.” 

A possible rational for regional escalation includes an attempt by Vučić to consolidate support ahead of local elections, which will take place later this month in 10 municipalities where his ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) dominates. Any loss of support could hinder SNS ability to maintain a majority in upcoming Parliamentary elections. Considering the anti-regime protests his government has faced, presenting a perceived security threat and increasing defense capabilities are perceived facile tactics to regain popularity. 

However, Belgrade also is feeling pressure from the conflict in Iran, demonstrated by its suspension of fuel exports. Concurrently with rising fuel prices, Serbia's majority Russian-owned oil company, NIS, which supplies 80% of Serbia’s oil, is seeking to renew a sanctions waiver from the United States as it awaits a sale to Hungary’s MOL. This reveals the large extent to which NIS is engrained in Serbia’s economy and its sensitivity to external shocks. While Serbia is increasing defense posturing and military spending, a volatile economic environment and sustained public discontent will most likely hinder any attempted offensive.  

Simultaneously, the tumultuous environment and military emphasis stemming from Belgrade has fueled ultranationalist groups in Serbia. Far-right, ultranationalist groups that uphold anti-Western, pro-Russian narratives expressed support for Iran and called for attacks on Bondstell, the U.S. military base in Kosovo. These groups do not explicitly support the Iranian regime, but rather are rallying behind anti-Western agendas. The danger lies, therefore, lies in Vučić’s own defense messaging, as these groups may take such rhetoric as legitimization for their own escalatory calls.  

Kosovo  

Kosovo’s Highest Court restricted President Vjosa Osmani from announcing snap elections before March 31, extending a political crisis that has lasted for more than a year. 

At the same time, the passage of the Law on Foreigners, which requires foreign nationals staying over 90 days to register with local police and obtain a residence permit, has ignited ethnic tensions related to Kosovo’s Serb population, straining Kosovo’s internal societal cohesion. While Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, noted the law as an important step toward new momentum for diplomacy between Kosovo and Serbia, ethnic Serbs residing in Kosovo fear the new law will treat them as foreign nationals, as many retain their Serbian citizenship.

Some fear that the law will be instrumentalized to restrict institutions connected to Serbian presence, including education systems, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and health care. Already, students and teachers at the University of North Mitrovica, located in an ethnically Serb dominated region of Kosovo, are protesting the law. The university currently is affiliated with Serbia’s education system, but the new law will effectively integrate it into Kosovo’s education system. Similarly, the Serbian Orthodox Church remains critical to the Serbian national identity and culture. Fears of being targeted by the new law have heightened the perception of marginalization within Kosovo’s minority population. 

Considering Kosovo’s governance stasis and Serbia’s defense posturing, increasing fissures along ethnic lines are raising regional security concerns. 

Albania 

Two rulings contributed to further polarization of Albania’s political environment this week: finality on former Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Ballaku’s immunity and a ruling that Parliament’s ban on TikTok was unconstitutional.

Parliament rejected the decision of Special Structure against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK) on Ballaku that mandated her immunity be lifted, and Rama said the case was closed. The reality, however, is that his Ruling Socialist Party MPs utilized its majority to facilitate this outcome, which only furthered resentment from opposition Democratic Party amid its mobilization of antigovernment protests. 

Democratic Party supporters protested outside during the vote, and Democratic Party leader Sali Berisha accused Rama of “using the laws and the constitution for his own interest.” Although the outcome was expected following Rama’s shielding of Ballaku during the probe over allegations that she manipulated tenders while serving as minister of infrastructure and energy, the rejection of SPAK’s ruling emphasizes Rama’s ability to push executive limits of power utilizing his legislative majority. 

Further intra-parliamentary conflict arose from Albania’s top court ruling that the government’s one-year ban on TikTok was unconstitutional, arguing that the ban violated freedom of the press and expression. Rama advocated for the ban following the death of a 14-year-old boy who was stabbed by a peer following report that the two “clashed online.” At the time, the ban was met with pushback, citing restrictions on free speech. Now, opposition parties are capitalizing on these grievances to portray the ruling Socialist Party as promulgating censorship and continue mobilizing protests against Rama. 

In his response to the ruling, Rama claimed that “the Constitutional Court seems to think that 90% of Albanian parents and teachers were wrong when they asked for TikTok to be shut down.” Combined with rejection of SPAK’s ruling, this populist rhetoric emphasizes continued friction between separation of powers and institutional checks and balances that could threaten Albania’s EU bid. Amid Rama’s joint statement with Vučić in favor of partial EU accession without veto, these highlights a potential reshuffle of Rama’s political tactics to mirror Vučić, a similarly embattled executive facing domestic discontent and increasingly challenges the limits of executive power.  

Regional Implications 

The continued convergence of Albania and Serbia on external affairs– two once ideologically opposed dominant regional powers–  could prompt either a clash for regional dominance, thus actualizing Vučić’s escalation claims, or make room for cooperation based on executives challenging the rules-based international order through pursuing multi-vector policies and transactional foreign policy that enables greater economic concessions for material gain. 

Belgrade may see its neighbors’ internal political fissures, including Kosovo’s political stasis and increased dissatisfaction among the Serb population in Kosovo and Albania’s political instability, as opportunity to increase its rhetorical escalation as a means of antagonizing regional conflict to secure its own imperatives of reconsolidating power amid sustained domestic protests and mounting EU pressure for renewed negotiations with Kosovo.