The Big Picture: The key change for the Western Balkans under the new German government will be the consolidation of EU policy coordination under the CDU. For the first time in years, CDU officials lead the Chancellery, Foreign Office, and Ministry of Economy — all key levers in Germany’s role within the EU.
The new government views EU enlargement as a geopolitical reality rather than merely a political priority. Unlike the 2021-2025 agreement that preceded Olaf Scholz’s entry into the Chancellery, the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition agreement twice that regional governments fully realize their assigned reforms before the next round of enlargement can occur. In direct conversation with the author, officials in the new government indicated that they such a posture will allow only one or two candidate states to accede to the bloc in the next five years, creating space for the EU to undergo its own (also laid out in the coalition agreement) before any additional enlargement.
Insight: The Merz government is promoting a gradual and conditional EU accession process, prioritizing integration for Ukraine, Moldova, and select Western Balkan states, while sidelining Türkiye and Georgia. Key ministries related to EU policy are now under CDU control, streamlining Germany’s stance on enlargement.
The coalition agreement thus wherein candidates will gradually earn benefits—e.g., joining EU programs, observer status, and associate membership in foreign and security policy without voting rights—as they meet subsequent EU membership thresholds. In practice, this means Berlin is carving out a new, more flexible pathway for countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and several Western Balkans states to deepen their integration with the EU, offering them accelerated access to funding, markets, and institutional cooperation even before full membership. At the same time, this approach appears to sideline countries like Türkiye and Georgia, whose accession talks have stalled or faced political resistance, effectively placing them on a slower, more uncertain track despite years of engagement.
Insight: The German government has scrapped special envoy roles, including the one for the Western Balkans, signaling austerity and consolidation but potentially weakening diplomatic engagement. Meanwhile, Germany’s rare unilateral sanctions against leaders in BiH’s RS entity underscore a tougher, more geopolitically driven approach.
The new coalition, however, has eliminated the position of the special representative for the Western Balkans, part of its campaign promise of broader spending cuts and government streamlining. While this and other reductions signal institutional consolidation, they risk reducing Germany’s diplomatic visibility and engagement in fragile, strategic regions like the Western Balkans.
A month prior to the new coalition agreement, with Scholz in a technical mandate, Germany and Austria issued a rare joint travel ban senior officials from the Republika Srpska (RS) entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in response to their ongoing assault on the country’s constitutional order. This move was unusual for Germany, which since reunification has almost exclusively pursued its foreign policy through multilateral channels and avoided coercive measures like sanctions.
The Bottom Line: Berlin’s new coalition is reframing EU enlargement as a slow-burn, conditional process—limiting near-term accessions to one or two frontrunners, wielding sanctions to deter Balkan obstructionists, and carving out a five-year window for overdue reforms inside the Union.
Merz’s rise likely will prompt a more streamlined and strategically aligned German policy toward EU ascension but with less symbolic and institutional attention to the Western Balkans. The path to integration remains open for the region, but Berlin’s approach is expected to be cautious, transactional, and part of a broader foreign policy recalibration, likely coupled with a stronger stance against anti-democratic actions in its immediate neighborhood.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not an official policy or position of the New Lines Institute Western Balkans Center.
