Opinion
Serbia’s Regime Crisis Risks Regional Fallout
Carly Brant - 19 Sep 2025
Opinion
Carly Brant
Student Fellow, New Lines Institute
Ten months have passed since the Novi Sad railway canopy collapse that killed 16 people and ignited student-led protests on Nov. 1, 2024. The ongoing protests began with goals to express dissatisfaction with President Aleksandar Vučić’s growing authoritarian rule, challenge state-led corruption, and demand public transparency in foreign-funded infrastructure projects, especially those connected to Chinese state companies, such as in Novi Sad.
Almost a year in, Serbia’s protests have yet to actualize regime change or formative political reform. As nationwide public demonstrations turn violent, they expose regime vulnerability, causing Vučić to turn to populist tactics and power spectacles. Further, he is deepening external alignment with China and Russia in an attempt to reconsolidate power. Efforts to recentralize domestic control present a danger for regional security amid rising tensions and deteriorating dialogue with Kosovo.
The Vučić regime is vulnerable. The strongest indicator of this vulnerability is sustained intensity and turnout of public demonstrations marked by expansion to small towns; violent clashes between protestors, police, and loyalists; and anti-government chants, including “He is finished.”
The offices of Vučić’s ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) were set on fire during direct clashes between police and protestors. Beyond explicitly weakening state infrastructure, attacks on government buildings symbolically deteriorate the regime’s authority by destroying material symbols of Vučić’s power, signaling high levels of frustration and an end to peaceful dissent.
This public pressure has exposed vulnerabilities in security and infrastructural services. It has also compelled resignations, the most notable being those of former Prime Minister Miloš Vučevic’s government in January 2025, exposing explicit structural vulnerabilities within the government.
The West continuously criticizes Serbia’s government for its anti-democratic responses to protestors, including the suspected deployment of illegal weaponry, police crackdowns, arbitrary arrests, and labeling protestors “terrorists.”
In a recent visit to Austria, European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos acknowledged the EU has “a problem in Belgrade.” This statement is in direct reaction to Vučić calling European Parliament members visiting Serbia to support protestors “scum.” Such rhetoric deteriorates Serbia’s relationship with the EU, which spurs further regime vulnerability by jeopardizing the millions of dollars the EU funnels annually toward Serbia’s infrastructure.
As Vučić’s regime becomes increasingly vulnerable to domestic pressure and weakening relations with the West, the president is resorting to populist tactics and reactionary power demonstrations to signal control and resolve.
To reconcile regime weakness, Vučić has sought control of independent media outlets, called for pro-government rallies, pushed to relieve economic pressures by limiting interest rates and capping profit margins on food and consumer goods, and utilized discourse that frames protestors as internal threats to the Serbian state. Leveraging protests to mobilize support, controlling the narrative through media suppression, promoting polarization, and artificially improving living standards are all actions that demonstrate populist moves.
Vučić’s military parade, titled “Strength of Unity” and set to take place on Sept. 20, is a similar power play. Rather than serving as a symbol of national unity—the typical goal for such demonstrations—the parade will serve as a demonstration of government power meant to intimidate protestors and signal control.
Vučić attended Moscow’s Victory Day Parade in May and was one of the few European leaders to attend Beijing’s Military Parade earlier this month. Flaunting visibly strong ties with actors like Russia and China artificially projects Vucic's regime as not only secure but also internationally recognized, exposing attempts to convert domestic vulnerability into regime legitimacy.
Specifically, during his visit to China, Vučić met with at least 14 Chinese corporations, indicating deepening economic cooperation with China. Similarly, a pipeline endeavor in cooperation with Hungary, which will connect Serbia to Moscow’s Druzhba route, highlights infrastructure coordination with Russia. Such initiatives are in direct opposition to protest demands, illustrating Vučić’s deliberate indifference toward compromise.
Recalling Putin’s “hospitality and warm welcome” during his May visit to Moscow, Vučić thanked his Russian counterpart and expressed gratitude for Putin’s “support in preserving the territorial integrity of Serbia.”
This discourse does more than reinforce Belgrade’s alignment with Moscow. Vučić’s appeal to “territorial integrity” before Putin, who is actively waging a war of territorial conquest in Ukraine, signals a calculated regime positioning, one that is deeply alarming considering Republika Srpska’s (RS) impending referendum and mounting frictions with Kosovo.
Regime vulnerability is perhaps the most important signal indicating a potential regional security crisis. Populist leaders like Vučić often address unrest through ultra-nationalist rhetoric, control of media and state institutions, and demonstrations of power. When these tactics fail, such leaders provoke international conflict and use inflammatory rhetoric to redirect public attention toward a unified goal aimed at evoking national pride.
Thus, while the risk of direct armed conflict is low, mounting tensions between Belgrade and Pristina—marked by politicized arrests and an ongoing governance crisis in Kosovo surrounding Serb representation—present Vučić with an opportunity to manipulate tensions to his advantage. This would shift domestic attention away from protests toward a common international goal to mobilize the Serbian public against a common and historically symbolic cause.
Albania and Kosovo’s recent announcement of a potential joint military signifies that Pristina feels this threat from Belgrade.
Belgrade’s furious response to the prospective military effort—calling the initiative a direct threat—should not be taken lightly. Vučić’s letters to the European Commission warn that political protest poses a risk “not only to Serbia, but also to the stability of the wider Western Balkans, which are fragile societies where such tactics could easily be replicated, undermining regional peace.” When analyzed with measures taken domestically to recentralize control, Vučić’s statements can be seen as a covert threat to regional escalation.
This threat is especially dangerous given that the U.S. recently suspended talks with Kosovo, accusing the caretaker government of increasing tensions and instability in the region. Vučić could view the loss of U.S. backing as an opportunity to escalate tensions.
Mounting violence, symbolic power demonstrations, and deepening international ties are signs that Vučić is instrumentalizing domestic tensions to recentralize control. Should these stressors continue, given regional vulnerabilities that include Dodik’s RS referendum, Kosovo’s government stall, and Albania-Kosovo military efforts, Vučić may resort to antagonizing regional destabilization as a last-ditch effort to unify the nation.
As Serbia’s domestic demonstrations continue, the following indicators will signal whether the unrest is hardening into deeper domestic destabilization, mounting regime vulnerability, and a heightened risk of regional spillover.
Unscheduled Serbian security mobilizations near the Kosovo border, including reservist call-ups or the reappearance of armed “self-defense” groups in the north, would sharply increase the risk of miscalculation with Kosovo police forces and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).
Rapid legal centralization, such as expanded anti-terror powers or “foreign agents” law, coupled with a spike in preventive detentions, would mark a shift from episodic crackdowns to durable repression.
Sudden resignations, defections, or public splits among police, intelligence services, or ruling-party elites would signal cracks in regime cohesion that often precede harsher repression or diversionary external moves.
Taken together, these metrics function as early warnings of a sharper turn toward repression at home or diversionary moves abroad.